The Phenomenological Self in the Works of Jerzy Kosinski by Houston, Tracy Allen
The University of Maine
DigitalCommons@UMaine
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Fogler Library
2003
The Phenomenological Self in the Works of Jerzy
Kosinski
Tracy Allen Houston
University of Maine - Main
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons
This Open-Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine.
Recommended Citation
Houston, Tracy Allen, "The Phenomenological Self in the Works of Jerzy Kosinski" (2003). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 33.
http://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd/33
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL SELF IN THE WORKS 
OF JERZY KOSINSKI 
BY 
Tracy Allen Houston 
B.A. University of Maine, 2001 
A THESIS 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
(in English) 
The Graduate School 
The University of Maine 
August, 2003 
Advisory Committee: 
Welch Everman, Professor of English, Advisor 
T. Jeff Evans, Associate Professor of English 
Steven Evans, Assistant Professor of English 
O 2003 Tracy Allen Houston 
All Rights Reserved 
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL SELF IN THE WORKS 
OF JERZY KOSINSKI 
By Tracy Allen Houston 
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Welch Everman 
An Abstract of the Thesis Presented 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the 
Degree of Master of Arts 
(in English) 
August, 2003 
A scholar who wishes to examine the works of Jerzy Kosinski faces a problem not 
found in the study of many other authors: Kosinski's personal history, critical to many 
approaches to the study of literature, is filled with fictions, contradictions, and 
unverifiable events. For years Kosinski's first novel, The Painted Bird, was taken to be 
autobiographical. However, as interest in Kosinski's work grew, inconsistencies and 
obvious falsehoods contradicted this accepted autobiographical reading. The Painted Bird 
describes the wanderings of a young boy in Eastern Europe during WWII, yet Kosinski 
was not separated fiom his parents as had been previously believed. 
However, within Kosinski's texts there are many events that can be related to his 
personal life: the loss of nearly his entire family to the Nazis, his first marriage, and many 
other elements are verifiable. Because fact and fiction blend into one another in 
Kosinski's personal history, it is difficult to know how to address his work. 
This thesis posits that Kosinski's personal life constitutes a tenth text, a text 
available for study, which can inform Kosinski's novels. By drawing parallels between 
his life as reported and his written work, Kosinskian scholars can examine emergent 
patterns of behavior and the philosophical foundations of his project. These foundations 
provide a tool for examining Kosinski's novels, allowing a greater understanding of those 
texts typically considered problematic, especially Being There and The Hermit of 6Pth 
Street. 
This examination focuses on Kosinski's concept of the Self, dividing the Self into 
two parts: the interior "subjective Self' and the Self available for examination, the 
"phenomenological Self." The subjective Self is defined as that which it typically known 
as the "true Self," that which is unavailable to the Other. However, the phenomenological 
Self is often constructed by the Other, through the use of labels, prejudice, and habit. 
Kosinski's philosophy of the Self emerges as a willful attempt at Self-authorship, a 
determination to willfully create a phenomenological Self, that set of behaviors, 
appearance, and affiliations that can provide advantage in dealing with the Other. 
This thesis contends that Kosinski's project was to influence the Other's 
perception of the Self to protect the subjective Self. Kosinski's metaphor of the painted 
bird becomes important in this reading. Within this framework, the bird is always painted 
by perceptions; for Kosinski the choice was whether the painting of the bird was to be 
done by the Other or the Self. 
This theory is then applied to Kosinski's texts, showing how Being There and The 
Hermit of 6gh Street are, in fact, consistent with this philosophy. Both show an emphasis 
on the perceptions of the Other and the Self s struggle with those perceptions. The thesis 
does not attempt an in-depth study of Kosinski's canon, but the creation of a critical tool 
that may be useful in Kosinskian studies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is common in the study of literature to relate the works that an author writes to 
his or her personal and historical contexts. It has become a tradition, casting light on the 
works of such writers as Milton, Fitzgerald, Shalamov, Conrad, and countless others. It 
therefore poses a unique problem for critics and readers when details of an author's life 
are absent or in question. The ability to comprehend Milton's Paradise Lost without an 
understanding of the author's blindness, not to mention his role in the Interregnum, 
would be greatly hampered. If Shalamov's presence in the work camps of the former 
Soviet Union were in question, The Kolyma Tales would be addressed far more as fiction 
than it is, though many episodes in that work are fictive renderings of actual events. The 
Polish-American author Jerzy Kosinski poses just that problem. He purposefully clouded 
the issue, obscured facts, and presented multiple, and often contradictory, versions of his 
history. Without an accurate understanding of his life, how is a critic to address 
Kosinski's canon? One important key lies in an examination of his life as he reported it. 
At the end of almost all of Jerzy Kosinski's paperback editions there is a blurb 
titled "On Kosinski." Not all of the paperbacks carrying his name have this stock piece, 
but if the novel you're holding was published in the seventies or early eighties, you'll 
probably find it. It runs about four pages, varying only slightly from novel to novel, and 
cites reviews and articles written about him. It also includes biographical information. 
The blurb at the end of The Devil Tree, his fourth novel, opens with the following: "To 
appreciate the violent, ironic, suspenseful, morally demanding world of Jerzy Kosinski's 
novels, one must first acknowledge the random succession of pain and joy, wealth and 
poverty, persecution and approbation, that have made his own life often as eventful as 
those of his fictional creations" (The Devil Tree 207). One of the ironies of this opening 
passage is that, because Kosinski "has long made a practice of smudging the borders 
between his biography and his storytelling" (Schiff 222), it is difficult to know what 
details about his history ought or ought not be acknowledged. 
Should we, as readers, accept the next paragraph's assertion that "When he was 
six, all but two members of his once numerous and distinguished family were lost in the 
Holocaust of World War II?" (The Devil Tree 207). Yes, we should. Kosinski and his 
parents survived World War 11, unlike countless Jews, Gypsies, Soviet prisoners of war, 
and sympathetic gentiles. 
Yet, following this factual statement, the piece says, "Abandoned, suspected of 
being a Jew or Gypsy, he fled alone from village to village in Nazi-occupied Eastern 
Europe" (207). This echoes the story of the young boy in Kosinski's first novel, The 
Painted Bird, often taken as autobiographical; yet this is not factually what happened to 
young Jerzy Kosinski. His father, Mojzesz Lewinkopf, was a fore-sighted man. He was 
able to secure papers, changing the family name to the less Jewish-sounding "Kosinski." 
He was also able to get his family out of Lodz before it was too late. The family then 
moved several times, experiencing many close calls, but remaining free of the ghettoes 
and camps and, more importantly in regards to his history, remaining together. 
Immediately following this fiction of his wandering the countryside is yet 
another: "At the age of nine, in a traumatic confrontation with a hostile peasant crowd he 
lost the power of speech, and was unable to talk for over five years" (207). This is 
another event directly out of The Painted Bird. This too does not line up with personal 
historical events, as Kosinski admitted when he "suggested that the boy [in The Painted 
Birq's muteness was best described as symbolic" (Lupack 6). 
The standardized "On Kosinski" blurb goes on to relate that Kosinski's "father 
was a scholar of ancient linguistics, his mother was a pianist" (The Devil Tree 207), a 
claim that, while not technically a direct lie, is still very misleading (Lupack 6). It says 
that his position in Poland's Academy of Sciences was that of associate professor (The 
Devil Tree 207), a statement he later revised to assistant professor, but in actuality he was 
a graduate teaching assistant (Lupack 6). It relates his daring plan to escape Poland by 
inventing four distinguished professors who then provided him with letters of support, a 
story also without any basis in fact (Sloan 94-6). The jobs he held upon arriving in 
America, the details of his marriage to Mary Weir (his first wife), his history with horses, 
and other tidbits are slanted, misleading, or inaccurate. 
However, the piece contains as much fact as fiction. It says: "On [Kosinski's] way 
from Paris to the Beverly Hills home of his friend, film director Roman Polanski, and his 
wife, Sharon Tate, Kosinski's luggage was unloaded by mistake in New York. . . . 
Kosinski reluctantly stayed overnight in New York. That very night in Polanski's 
household the Charles Manson Helter-skelter gang murdered five people - among them 
Kosinski's closest friends" (The Devil Tree 210). Though this scene appeared in Blind 
Date, and there was some strong controversy surrounding its plausibility, it is, in 
Kosinski's biographer's as well as this author's opinion, "essentially the truth" (Sloan 
278). 
Likewise, other details in the "On Kosinski" piece are verifiably true, such as his 
efforts as a humanitarian, his teaching career in the United States (at Wesleyan, 
Princeton, and Yale), his unusual sleep pattern, his love of skiing and polo, and his 
impressive list of awards. They are impressive, too: The Painted Bird won the French 
Best Foreign Book Award in 1966; Steps earned the National Book Award in 1969; he 
received the Award in Literature of the American Academy and the National Institute of 
Arts and Letters in 1970, as well as the Brith Sholom Humanitarian Freedom Award in 
1974. For writing the screenplay for Being There, his third novel, he received the 
Writer's Guild of America Best Screenplay of the Year Award in 198 1. 
Before taking his own life in 199 1, Jerzy Kosinski wrote nine novels, two non- 
fiction books, self-published pamphlets, and pages of essays. He appeared as Zinoviev in 
the movie Reds, at the request of his fiiend, Warren Beatty. He had traveled extensively 
in the Americas, Europe, and Asia. He was a regular on talk shows, appeared on the 
cover of magazines, and was interviewed numerous times. His life, without the fictional 
embellishments, was one of tragedy, triumph, success, loss, superstardom, notoriety, and, 
ultimately, survival. With a life this varied, this full of experience, this public, and this 
controversial, why then did Kosinski feel the need to blur "the borders between his 
biography and his storytelling?" It's important to remember that this history of half fact, 
half fiction is not the result of misreading his novels or failing to ask him the right 
questions; Jerzy Kosinski began most of the rumors about himself, fostered their 
acceptance, and denied ever so few of them. This begs the question of why didn't 
Kosinski come clean? Of course, when he first arrived in the United States, the invention 
of an interesting history, filled with danger and spy-novel deeds, may have served a 
function, giving him a place, a community, a few extra open doors. However, once he 
was established, the stories served less of an apparent purpose. 
In his biography, James Park Sloan points out that Kosinski was rehearsing many 
parts found in The Painted Bird long before he wrote the novel (107-8). That habit of 
testing out stories on those around him, during interviews, and on talk shows, would 
continue throughout his life. He told stories that were glaringly inconsistent. He invented 
new ideas on the spot and embellished old ones to suit his audience. For many years he 
denied publicly that he was Jewish, the one fact about his life he explicitly set straight. It 
could be said - and has been elsewhere (Lupack 25-6) - that Kosinski's grand purpose 
was to promote himself in an effort to manage how his books were received, playing the 
media to his own ends. While on the surface this seems to be a plausible explanation, it 
does not answer the questions of why, six years prior to writing his first novel, Kosinski 
was already practicing, modifying, and spreading his stories. Nor does it explain why 
some portions of his last novel, The Hermit of 6qh Street: The Working Papers of 
Norbert Kosky, contain passages that directly address his fictitious past, admitting in one 
scene between Kosky and his father's ghost, that portions of his history were his "fairy 
tale" (Hermit 3 1 O), while other passages reinforce old fables or generate new ones. 
It seems obvious that an understanding of Kosinski's relationship to his history 
cannot be reached through such a surface reading of his nine novels. I posit, instead, that 
Kosinski's life constitutes a tenth text, consciously controlled, obsessively revised, and 
purposefully disseminated. There is substantial support for such a reading, aside from the 
inconsistencies and verifiable errors. The most telling of these come from Kosinski 
himself. He, a fan of Proust, shared Proust's distrust of memory; in one essay Kosinski 
said, "I am not interested in explicit memory because I do not trust it. In my case memory 
is always clouded by my desire for inventiveness. I am no camera" (Passing By 8). He 
was aware, and often expressed his view, that memory is less a factual representation of 
one's actual history, but rather an imaginative re-creation of events, always suspect, 
subjective, and misleading. This is not to say that he didn't trust his memory about what 
had occurred to him in his past. Instead, he "often remarked upon the fallibility of 
memory, which makes every life a fiction created by its own author" (Sloan 108-9). 
Growing up, as Sloan pointed out, under two very powerful self-authored figures, Hitler 
and then Stalin, showed a young Kosinski that truth was "whatever one can persuade 
others to believe" (109). Yet Kosinski was a sociologist by education, and saw the 
individual in conflict with the collective, a running theme in his novels and the subject of 
several essays. If, as Sloan suggests, those two powerful figures showed him the relativity 
of truth, then Kosinski's ultimate goal was to use the techniques of the collective to 
protect the individual. 
Yet, that is still a shallow reading of Kosinski's work. Kosinski was not in direct 
confrontation with a collective actively attempting to impose itself upon him. His self- 
authoring was not a reactionary activity, but a conscious choice in defense of his Self, a 
point of strong belief for him. Sartre explains: 
it is in my 'being in the world' that the Other determines me. Our relation 
is not afiontal opposition but rather an oblique interdependence. In so far 
as I make a world exist as a complex of instruments which I use for the 
ends of my human reality, I cause myself to be determined in my being by 
a being who makes the world exist . . . for the ends of his reality. Moreover 
it is not necessary to understand this being-with as a pure concomitance 
which is passively received by my being. For Heidegger, to be is to be 
one's own possibilities; that is to make oneself be. . . . It is in complete 
freedom and by an original choice that, for example, I realize my being- 
with in the anonymous form of 'they.'. . . Authenticity and individuality 
have to be earned (Sartre 33 1-2, emphasis his). 
Kosinski, who was familiar with Sartre and Heidegger, saw the Self as that which must 
be determined by the individual and not by the Other. In quest of this, Kosinski 
disallowed the Other to determine who he was by removing the Other's power of 
knowledge. Instead, he created his Self and the presentation of that Self, which 
determined the Other's use of him. 
This fictional presentation, his personal myth as some have called it (Sloan), 
becomes his tenth novel, a text available for criticism, not to seek the truth, but to seek 
the authorial intent - the moral of the parable. This text, much like the nine novels he 
published, becomes one of the protagonist being-in, but not being-with, society. A 
surprising benefit of reading Kosinski in this manner is that it reveals much of value 
about Kosinski the author. The love of disguises, both cosmetic and behavioral, which 
occurs in several scenes in his novels, such as Steps, Cockpit, and The Hermit of 6gh 
Street, as well as in his real life, directly expresses his belief "that in order to survive, the 
Self must fool the world, must distract it with false identities, or, failing that, hide in 
places it can never be found" (Schiff 228). 
The constant need for control that also runs strongly through his novels, such as 
Steps, Blind Date, and Cockpit also manifested itself in his life. Kosinski was well-known 
as an obsessive editor, infuriating not a few people that had to deal with his last-minute 
revisions. "As Bantam's Stuart Applebaum says, 'If he had his way, he'd be climbing on 
top of the printing press to change the order of the type"' (230). Additionally, before 
publication of his paperback editions, he typically rewrote sections of his hardcover 
books, sometimes altering significant portions. This provides a potential explanation for 
his constant revision of his history, modifying and developing his past. 
It could be said that a revisionist history reveals a disregard for the actual 
experience, diminishing the importance of events in his life or revealing a dispassionate 
attitude toward those events. However, this is not the case. Kosinski's nine published 
novels, often compared with his life, illuminate their author's response to actual events in 
either a direct or metaphorical way. A reader cannot finish The Painted Bird without an 
understanding of the impact World War I1 had on Kosinski, whether the events detailed 
therein are factual or not. Blind Date's description of the murders at Roman Polanski's 
home leaves no question about how deeply they touched the author. A scene in Cockpit, 
where the protagonist is unexpectedly attacked by his roommate, has its corollary in 
Kosinski's life and reveals the mixed feelings Kosinski had about that encounter. If the 
occurrence of real-life events in Kosinski's novels indicates the depth of their relevance 
to his life, then his first marriage, to Mary Weir, affected him greatly. It is represented, in 
differing ways and lengths, in three of his novels: Being There, The Devil Tree, and Blind 
Date. Rather than diminishing the importance of the events of his life, Kosinski revealed 
a strong tie to his personal history, keeping the importance of events close to himself -- 
failure to do otherwise would be to allow an external definition of his Self -- but still 
attempting to portray those events in a manner that captured the deeper, essential truth. 
The blurring of the borders between his biography and his storytelling allowed events in 
his life to bleed into his fiction just as fiction masked his life. 
Early in the morning of May 3, 1991, Jerzy Kosinski committed suicide. As with 
many events in Kosinski's life, a full accounting of the motives for this action can never 
be known, and to speculate upon them can be considered grotesque and naively futile. 
However, to treat Kosinski's life as a text, the final chapter deserves consideration. For 
many this could be interpreted as a defeat, a cessation of the Self in the face of a 
collective too powerful to battle. This, too, would be a misreading of his life and 
philosophy. In 1976, Kosinski's friend, Jacques Monod died after deciding to stop 
receiving the blood transfusions his hemolytic anemia demanded. Monod asked Kosinski 
to be with him his last few days. Kosinski later related this experience in the essay 
"Death in Cannes." In many ways, Monod had acted out the philosophy that Kosinski had 
penned in 1968 in his "The Art of the Self: Essays A Propos Steps." Though the essay 
covers a wide range of topics -- from plot, to montage, to the relationship of emotions to 
memories -- the most telling for the purposes of this paper is on suicide. Kosinski writes: 
In performing suicide a man chooses to escape from his future and from 
his past, thus overcoming the knowledge that he will die.. .To die in 
nature's time is to accede to a denial of man's dignity: to die in one's own 
time is to affirm that dignity. Suicide proves man's power to choose - his 
final act if nothing else.. .In committing suicide, the man makes himself 
historical . . . He is transferring the burden of his past onto the shoulders of 
the world, onto history. But even in self-destruction, his shadow outlives 
him. He imposes on other people the necessity for remembering and for 
judging him, for summarizing him as a character. He creates the means to 
outlive himself (Passing By 23 1). 
This philosophy, written twenty-three years before the deed, deals with the idea of man as 
character, a character that contains the means for self-authorship and self-determination. 
Just like a fictional text, a life is preordained to end. Kosinski the author chose to exert 
the same control over his life as he did over his novels. 
Kosinski's tenth novel, in this reading, becomes the context for his work. If 
memory and history as he viewed them are fictions, then an analysis of his work requires 
nothing more than the substitution of one fiction for another. In the end, Kosinski places 
the responsibility for judging him and the authenticity of his work upon his readers and 
critics. The above quote by Sartre continues: "Authenticity and individuality have to be 
earned: I shall be my own authenticity only if under the influence of the call of 
conscience . . . I launch out toward death with a resolute-decision . . . as toward my own 
most peculiar possibility. At this moment I reveal myself to myself in authenticity, and I 
raise others along with myself toward the authentic" (Sartre 332). 
This, then, becomes the starting point for an examination of Kosinski's concept 
and portrayal of the Self. Through Kosinski's writing, and his life, a philosophy of the 
Self emerges. What, however, is the Self? 
THE SELF 
For the purposes of this discussion, the Self can be broken into two related 
entities: the interior, or "subjective" Self and the apparent, or "phenomenological" Self. 
The subjective Self, when dealing with texts, is available only when the reader is exposed 
to unmediated thoughts from the character examined. An example of this would be 
Hamlet's dramatic monologue, which begins with, "To be or not to be." Of course, the 
case could be made that any information fiom a character is suspect, due to mediation by 
interior censors and language itself, but there are points where the reader is allowed to 
believe that these thoughts, feelings, and expressions come from a Self which is exposed 
and vulnerable to interpretation. It is during these moments that the reader is, for 
example, made privy to information that other characters do not know, allowed access to 
a character's motivations, and permitted to see the machinations behind the character's 
apparent actions. Thus, the readerlplaygoer is aware that Hamlet's madness is but a ruse, 
that he has further designs, even if he is unable or unwilling to take action on those 
designs. 
Much more often, however, the reader encounters only, or predominately, the 
phenomenological Self, that which is manifested by a character's actions, words, and 
reactions. Though the interior motives of that Self are unknown, that Self can be 
interpreted as  it is presented. That the presentation can be conscious or unconscious does 
not matter. 
At the very end of Steps, the reader is introduced to a scene in which the 
subjective Self and the phenomenological Self are very divergent. The protagonist has 
joined a revolution in order to experience it. He does not understand the language, so he 
displays a Self which is deaf-mute. This is not the subjective self, except in the most 
metaphoric way, but he is phenomenologically a deaf-mute. He is with other 
revolutionaries as they surround a building and bring out prisoners. 
The commander of our group ordered the prisoners to turn and face the 
wall. I was certain that they were about to be shot. Not wanting to 
participate in the execution, I gestured to the man next to me, offering to 
exchange my rifle for his long knife. The man agreed (Steps 144). 
The protagonist's subjective Self desired to participate in the revolution, but has no 
interest in shooting prisoners in the back. In line with this, he maneuvers the environment 
to protect him from having to do so. However, he is unsuccessful. 
I glanced around me: the armed men, tense and ready, stood at my sides 
and behind me. Only then did I realize that the prisoners were about to be 
beheaded. My refusal to obey orders would mean my being executed with 
those who stood in front of me (144-5). 
Events place the protagonist in a position that necessitates his performance of actions 
contrary to his desires. Realizing that his life is at stake should he fail to continue to live 
up to his phenomenological Self, he searches for a way to become that Self. 
It was inconceivable, I thought, that I would have to slash the neck of 
another man simply because events has placed me behind his back. What I 
was about to do was inescapable, yet so unreal that it became senseless: I 
had to believe I was not myselfany more and that whatever happened 
would be imaginary. I saw myselfas someone else who felt nothing, who 
stood calm and composed, determined enough to stiffen his arms, to grasp 
and raise the weapon, to cut down the obstacle in his path (145, emphasis 
mine). 
The protagonist needs to become another Self, to step from his subjective position, in 
which he does not want to either die or kill, and step into his phenomenological role, the 
role of a man who can kill and does not mind doing so. 
Survival, in Kosinski's world, governs actions. The reason for the 
phenomenological Self is to protect the subjective Self. As mentioned above, "Kosinski 
has worked at proving to his fiiends what his characters always prove - that in order to 
survive, the Self must fool the world, must distract it with false identities, or, failing that, 
hide in places it can never be found" (Schiff 228). The phenomenological Self is that 
distraction or, failing that, the shield behind which the subjective Self hides. It is 
presented; it is presented in language, textually, contextually, and consciously. 
The Self, or the phenomenological Self, then, is a textual creation. But who 
creates this textual entity? Is it Jerzy Kosinski, the author of the text? Finally this answer 
is yes, but not without complications.' In the real world, there are many ways of defining 
the Self. There is the set of social signifiers we all choose: if I wear a football jersey to 
class, I'm inviting those around me to talk to me about football; if I wear Christian 
Jewelry, I desire others to interact with me within a certain set of social codes. These may 
be conscious or unconscious choices, yet they are choices that we make. There is also the 
overtly conscious presentation of the Self, what one says, how one treats others, what one 
does for work and leisure. This may be thoughtless or thoughtful, but it is the volition of 
the being under which these boundaries exist. 
1 The question of Kosinski's authorship of his nine novels, called into question by the Village Voice and 
debated long since, exists outside the realm of this thesis. As this thesis is dealing with the question of 
criticizing Kosinski's canon fiom a nearly a-authorial perspective, it is also quite moot. 
For the Kosinskian character, the Self is a willful creation. The mode of dress, the 
manner of intercourse, and the means of communication are all choices made 
consciously. This demands an understanding of the Other and the Self; my understanding 
of my Self, phenomenologically if nothing else, comes from an awareness of my actions. 
That understanding is iconic: within the Kosinskian framework, the phenomenological 
Self is historical insofar as the individual has learned how to interact with the 
environment based upon past experiences, but that Self is also a-temporal; it exists in the 
now. The result is that the historical that informs the Self s actions is non-teleological. It 
is a process of rotation, one mask before another mask before another mask, like the 
Russian dolls, one within the other. 
To approach the Kosinskian Self from another angle, what the critic deals with are 
texts: novels, novellas, poems, letters, biographical information. Kosinski the author, the 
man from Poland, wrote texts: novels, essays, letters, and his own biographical 
information. Embedded within these texts are more texts: the characters that act as 
subjects and objects. These texts exist outside of linear time. 
The truth of time is not temporal. Analogously (analogously only), time as 
irreversible succession, is, according to Claudel, only the phenomenon, the 
epidermis, the surface image of the essential truth of the universe as it is 
conceived and created by God. This truth is absolute simultaneity. . . . In 
particular, a structuralist reading, by its own activity, always presupposes 
and appeals to the theological simultaneity of the book, and considers 
itself deprived of the essential when this simultaneity is not accessible 
(Derrida 24). 
It is Derrida's contention, through a reading of Proust and Claudel, that the text exists as 
an a-temporal truth, containing its possibilities simultaneously as the acorn contains the 
oak. Likewise, the texts of the Jerzy Kosinski contain all historical and future possibilities 
in the moment. 
The protagonist in Steps is a clear example of this, highlighted by the structure of 
the text: he is victimizer, victim, soldier, archaeologist, truck driver, Communist, student, 
liberator, juror, thief, and dockworker. The reader does not know in what order these 
events happened, nor even may the protagonist himself, but these facets of his Self come 
into play as needed. "Aware of its value as a restorative, I stole only black caviar" (Steps 
1 1 1). The reader does not know how the protagonist is aware of the benefits of caviar, but 
that knowledge informs his actions and, in consequence, his Self. 
Chance, from Being There, is another example of the character of the moment. He 
is truly an organism that responds to the environment. The amount of exertion that 
Chance expends in influencing his environment is almost non-existent. He is swept along 
by other people's perceptions and expectations. When told to leave, he leaves; when 
offered a place to stay, he stays; when asked a question, he answers; but, Chance does not 
attempt to manipulate his environment, the Other, toward his own ends. In many ways, 
Chance does not recognize his own ends. He desires to see television, the one impulse he 
acts upon, and he becomes hungry or scared or pained, but he has no conception of how 
to meet these other needs. In many ways, this is because those needs require a conception 
of futurity, the impetus to influence the environment, to manipulate the Other. Though 
Being There has been studied as a text condemning television and an examination of the 
efficacy of expectations, it is also a valuable presentation of the Self living in the 
perpetual moment - Derrida's simultaneous text.2 
The Self, in this sense, is always becoming. The Self cannot choose or know what 
it is, for being is a process. It can know what it was, insofar as it can examine the 
phenomenological actions of its own past, including its thoughts about those actions, 
even the thoughts that the Self experienced while performing those actions and thoughts 
about actions never performed, but this knowledge is still phenomenological. The Self 
has access to greater evidence, but this knowledge mandates neither understanding nor 
consistency. The Self can also determine what it will be. If history informs the Self s 
actions, it does not determine them. Kosinski was a practitioner and portrayer of the will 
of the individual, instead of, and in opposition to, the will of the collective. This implies 
and demands conscious and mindful free will of actions, and how those actions could 
influence or modify perceptions. The Self can determine what it will exhibit for behaviors 
and continue to become. For Kosinski, this becoming was not a movement toward a state, 
moving closer to some mode of being or perfection. Rather, this becoming was a state 
unto itself; the becoming became the method of interacting with his (and his 
protagonists') environment. 
Early in Steps, the protagonist finds himself without money, food or shelter in a 
land where he does not speak the language. He is hungry and tries to gain favor with the 
locals by smiling; he tries to ask for assistance at the police station. Nobody helps him 
and he returns to the beach. 
We'll revisit Being There later in this work as a sociological commentary on the Self created almost 
exclusively by television. 
I was famished and exhausted. The sun had brought on a pounding 
headache, I felt waves of vertigo. Unexpectedly I caught the sound of 
people talking in an alien language. Turning, I saw two women sitting 
close to the water. Folds of gray, heavily veined fat hung fiom their thighs 
and upper arms; their full, pendulous breasts were squashed in outsize 
brassieres. 
They sunbathed sprawling on their beach towels surrounded by 
picnic equipment: food baskets, thermos flasks, parasols, and nets full of 
h i t .  . . . I approached them slowly but directly, anxious not to alarm them. 
. . . We had no common language, but I was very conscious of the 
proximity of food (Steps 10). 
As always, for Kosinski and his protagonists, survival is the rule. Harsh events teach 
them that, in the end, survival is the only thing that matters. Maslow posited that the 
hierarchy of needs began with the essentials: food, shelter, and safety. Not until these 
needs have been met can the individual begin to concern itself with concepts of love, 
status, or being. For Kosinski, survival takes precedence. 
Before I could finish the meal, they had drawn the curtains and tom off 
their bathing suits. Naked they fell upon me. I was buried beneath their 
heavy bellies and broad backs; my arms were pinioned; my body was 
manipulated, squeezed, pressed, and thumped (1 1). 
The protagonist lets the alien women use his body for sex in order to get the food he 
needs to survive. 
Kosinski's works are episodic: the scenes in Steps do not occur in a linear 
chronological order. In Cockpit, the adventures of the protagonist, known as Tarden, 
though that is not his real name, move back and forth in time, linked by association rather 
than chronology. The story works as memory works, beginning at one point and moving 
to a related point, without concern for movement forward or backward across time. The 
scenes in Kosinski's other works, such as The Painted Bird, The Devil Tree, and Blind 
Date are more coherent, but even within these texts, there are bits and pieces that do not 
fit in the chronology; each scene moves backwards or forwards from the previous 
moment. This serves two functions: the chronology becomes confused and fragmented, 
operating more like memory, and it reveals the pattern of associations that the 
protagonistlnarrator experiences. This is Kosinski's history in its iconic form. 
This iconic, fluid, malleable sense of the Self, the phenomenological 
representation of the inner Self, seems to be false, enacted, and utilitarian instead of a true 
being. How can this apparent Self, which we know is not the real, interior Self, inform us 
of the characters, the texts, and their motivations? Kosinski and his characters play a 
dangerous game of distraction and illusion, and it is toward this end that the subterfuge 
manifests itself. To understand this, we must again turn to Sartre's Being and 
Nothingness: 
How then shall I experience the objective limits of my being: Jew, Aryan, 
ugly, handsome, kind, a civil servant, untouchable, etc. - when will speech 
have informed me as to which of these are my limits? . . . It is not that these 
objective characteristics must necessarily be abstract; some are abstract, 
others are not. . . . Therefore we are not dealing with an abstraction but 
with an ensemble of structures, of which certain are abstract but whose 
totality is an absolute concrete, an ensemble which simply is indicated to 
me as on principle escaping me. This ensemble is in fact what I am (Sartre 
675, emphasis his). 
What Sartre describes here is the phenomenology of the Self, including the textual: that 
which can be proven by document (place of birth, country of origin, etc), or by 
interrogation of the subject, where the subject is forced into identifying with the answer 
despite potentially unwanted repercussions.3 These are a set of structures, apparent to the 
Other, that determine the Other's perception of the being. If the individual is kind, rude, 
eloquent, or rash then the individual is that for the Other. 
This concretized knowledge of the being is based on the perception of the Other. 
If Bill visits John's house and later speaks with Frank, he may tell him, "I saw John's 
place. It's a nice place and very tidy. John is a neat person." Yet, if John knew of Bill's 
visit beforehand, he may have cleaned his place up, vacuumed, taken out the trash, 
hidden the piles of papenvork, and made the bed. John is a neat person only because Bill 
perceives him as such. Frank may reply, having visited John without forewarning, 
"Really? I thought he was a slob. There were pizza boxes on the floor and dirty dishes in 
the sink." To Frank, John is a slob, because he has perceived him as such. Which is true? 
Because John cleaned his apartment, does that make him neat, a slob, or neither? Does it 
make him a slob who wishes to appear neat or a person who wants to provide a clean 
place for his friends? In the end, it doesn't matter. John is as John is, and the Other's 
3 For many in the Holocaust, it was unthinkable to lie about religion or culture, despite the persecution that 
could result from telling the truth. 
perception of him has weight only so long as the phenomenological experience of John 
confirms that perception. 
Kosinski highlights this fluid perception in a passage from Steps. The dialogue 
between the unnamed man and woman, which provides the appearance of tying the 
episodes together, touches on many themes. In one, the two are discussing why the man 
has used prostitutes: 
But why would you want aprostitute? What could she do that I 
don't? Is she more willing than I am? 
I do with her what you wouldfind unacceptable. 
How do you know I would? 
Because you know me only in a certain way. And because our 
relationship is based on your acceptance of what I have been with you. 
Then what I assume to be you is only one side ofyou. 
You also offer only the side ofyourselfwhich you think is most 
acceptable to me. So far neither of us has revealed anything which 
contradicts what we have both always assumed (Steps 60- l ) .~  
The man realizes, and tries to explain to the woman, that neither can be contained by the 
limited experience of one another. What she knows about him is not exhaustive, just as 
he knows only what he knows about her. This is the phenomenological experience of the 
Other. Kosinski realizes that he is Other to the Other. This provided the opportunity to 
influence the Other by modifying the phenomenological experience he presented to the 
Other. 
4 Within Steps, the narrative dialogue entries are all in italics. 
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THIS PHILOSOPHY OF SELF IN KOSINSKI'S WORKS 
For Kosinski, the malleability of the phenomenological Self, that of his characters 
as well as himself, provided the opportunity to influence the Other's response to the 
individual. Perceptions may be formed and dissolved without conscious effort, but they 
could be influenced by the perceived. Tarden, in Cockit, reveals many ways that 
perceptions could be manipulated. At one point Tarden buys a pair of custom-made 
military uniforms. They belong to no nation or branch of service. He has them tailored, 
using the lapels from one nation, the epaulets from another, the collar from a third, and so 
on. The Other began responding to this new, calculated presentation immediately: 
I had a chance to use the salute frequently during later fittings: any time a 
military man caught sight of my uniform, he promptly saluted. One.. . 
heavily decorated general.. . took a look at my costume and saluted me 
with the warm smile of an old soldier passing the torch to a younger man. 
I was saluted deferentially by a young captain.. . The captain paid me the 
respect that the new guard shows toward the veteran (Cockit 133). 
The other soldiers at the tailor's saw what they wanted to see: a fellow military man. 
Once the uniforms were done, the chance to influence the Other became even greater. 
The concierge at the hotel, the parking lot attendant, policemen, head waiters, and airlines 
personnel all give him preferential treatment. They do not know who he is, what his rank 
is, or what country he is from, yet they see the uniform and automatically defer to it. 
This experience of allowing the Other to see what the Self wants runs through 
Kosinski's work and life. In Steps, the protagonist imitates a deaf-mute. He becomes, for 
the Other, "a silent, gesturing spastic [who] was not a threat to callers - [he] could be 
given a task, a few coins, and then dismissed" (Steps 137-8). Not surprisingly, Kosinski 
told a story once about performing this same act. He told of a small industrial town where 
he would visit when he played polo. "And, so, over the years, I would go there to the 
little town, and since I'm not Latin, and I would like to be Latin, I pretended I was deaf- 
mute. I didn't really lie. I don't speak Spanish, which means I'm mute. And I don't 
understand Spanish, which means I'm deaf' (Passing By 249-50). For some time he lived 
as a deaf-mute from another town, accepted and welcomed. This was no more who he 
was than who the protagonist in Steps was, but a persona designed to make the Other's 
eye label and move on. 
In Blind Date Levanter uses an ID from the American Council for Global Security 
to evade a ticket for double-parking (Blind Date 1 13-4). The ID came from a small 
educational society, but the police officer sees what he wants to see: an identification 
card that places Levanter in a role not dissimilar from his own. Like Tarden's uniform, 
the card allows the protagonist to influence the Other's perceptions treatment of him. 
Not all of Kosinski's books display this theme in the same manner. Most critics 
notice a substantial difference between Being There and the rest of Kosinski's work. 
However, this theme is played out similarly in Being There and The Devil ~ r e e . ~  Chance, 
as discussed earlier, is the "Blank Page" upon which the Other projects its expectations. 
Probably one of the best-known scenes by Kosinski is the one in which Chance tells the 
President, "In a garden, . . . growth has its season. There are spring and summer, but there 
are also fall and winter. And then spring and summer again. As long as the roots are not 
severed, all is well and all will be well" (Being There 57). The President takes this 
5 Though my thesis does not address Kosinski's full canon, touching only tangentially on Pinball and 
Passion Play, the themes explored here can be found , in various forms, in all of his texts. Notably, Passion 
Play will be referenced later in connection with Kosinski's fascination with other Self-Authored people. 
statement as sage advice about the endurance of American economy. Chance does not 
understand economics. He understands gardening, and his words are taken 
metaphorically. He is the text interpreted by the reader, the phenomenological Self 
created by the Other. 
Echoes of this portrayal can be found in The Devil Tree. Whalen is a rich orphan, 
who is attractive, self-analytical, and intelligent. He also lacks direction, stability, and 
focus. Out of this mix comes the anti-Chance character. While Chance is not cognizant of 
the Other in the way most people are, Whalen is very aware of the Other and the Other's 
perceptions of him. Yet, Whalen finds himself in a role not dissimilar from Chance. 
Because of Whalen's wealth, he is assumed t~ be a particular type of person. Because he 
is attractive he is expected to have certain characteristics. The Other projects a Self onto 
Whalen as easily, and as readily, as the Other projects a Self onto Chance. Both Chance 
and Whalen allow the Other to do this, Chance because this is the way he has learned to 
interact with the Other, Whalen because he can, at any time, contradict the Other's 
perceptions. 
The thought that tortures Whalen is actually found in Being There. It is the 
understanding of the distinction between the interior Self and the phenomenological Self. 
"Whatever one did would then be interpreted by the others in the same way that one 
interpreted what they did. They could never know more about one than one knew about 
them" (37). For Chance, this is the rule by which he engages with the world, the laws of 
intercourse. For Whalen, this is the great tragedy; he can never know Karen, his (for a 
lack of better description) love interest, in the manner he wishes, and he can never reveal 
himself completely to her. 
Kosinski and his protagonists consciously and unconsciously thwart the Other's 
attempt to understand, label, and know the Self. Tarden and the other characters use the 
Other's habit of perception to turn the collective against itself. However, this does little to 
illuminate why the Self in the predominance of Kosinski's work needs to present a 
fictional persona. The key to Kosinski's obsession with this apparentlinner dislocation is 
in his first novel, The Painted Bird. In many ways, the rest of Kosinski's canon, in this 
reading, is a continual playing out of themes begun there.6 
In The Painted Bird, the young boy who wanders Eastern Europe during the 
Holocaust goes through many stages of understanding and interaction with the Other. 
One factor that makes his life so difficult, aside from being alone and at the whim of a 
culture with which he is unfamiliar, is his dark "gypsy" eyes and hair. This marks him in 
a part of the world where most are fair. Because he cannot hide this about himself, he is 
constantly suspected of using the "evil eye" on people and their livelihood. "Whenever I 
attempted to walk through the village alone, people would turn their heads and make the 
sign of the cross. What is more, pregnant women would run away from me in panic. The 
bolder peasants unleashed dogs on me" (The Painted Bird 21). The young boy is feared, 
and the fear results in a particular treatment, in this case, persecution. 
The boy recognizes that his appearance, his phenomenon, makes the Other do 
this, enables the Other to do this. In response to this he tries to find ways of reducing the 
threat to his health and life. He attempts to survive, the original and only rule. He hides, 
he dresses in a manner that conceals his difference at a distance, he avoids contact, he 
develops means of dissuading others from attacking him by use of his "comet" -- a can on 
6 The Hermit of 6gh Street is, at first, problematic in this reading. However, as will be shown, this too is an 
extension discussed later in this thesis. 
the end of a string, used as a portable stove -- or other advantage, and he dreams. "I 
dozed off thinking of the inventions I would like to make. For example, a fuse for the 
human body which, when lighted, would change old skin for new and alter the color of 
the eyes and hair. . . . A fuse which could protect anybody from an evil eye. Then nobody 
would fear me and my life would become easier and pleasant" (91). The boy dreams of 
fitting in, being less noticeable, of a better means of survival. The boy wants to change 
into the Other, to become one with the collective because he believes that if he can just 
find the right means of fitting in, he will survive. 
He tries several tactics for fitting in: being a good worker, imitating the local 
dialect, learning the ways of spirits, praying to God, and immersing himself in 
Communism. None of these brings him any closer to his goal, though each time he feels 
as though he has finally found the right way. What he doesn't realize is that he cannot fit 
in because he is the painted bird. Unlike the birds that Lekh paints with his brush, the boy 
is painted by the perceptions of the Other. He is seen as a dark child, unlike the people of 
the area. His appearance and dialect mark him as foreign, different, and dangerous. 
Whether he is Jewish or not is of no concern because he looks Jewish. Each time he tries 
to join the flock he invites abuse, attacks, and the threat of death. He is the bird of 
difference. 
Toward the end of The Painted Bird, the boy begins to realize this. Mitka had 
taught him lessons about justice, about the interior ethical judge that determines 
responses and punishment for offense. 
All the time I thought of Mitka's teachings: a man should never let himself 
be mistreated, for he would then lose his self-respect and his life would 
become meaningless. . . . Only the conviction that one was as strong as the 
enemy and that one could pay him back double, enabled people to survive, 
Mitka said. A man should take revenge according to his own nature and 
the means at his disposal (214). 
This philosophy presents an ethical foundation that allows the subjective Self to 
determine justice and judge the Other's treatment of the Self. The boy learns this and 
finds that this provides a framework through which the subjective Self can modify and 
use the phenomenological Self according to those ethical rules. This generalizes to 
include a treatment of the Other that is not determined solely by insult. It begins a 
determination of the Other's right to knowledge, a right protected in the name of survival. 
The boy learns that he can determine Other's reactions by modifying his 
presentation, by lying. He modifies the Other's right to know, so that the Other knows 
only so much, or only what he wishes the Other to know. Near the end of the novel, the 
boy is placed in an orphanage, mixed with hundreds of other children who have been 
affected by the war. Wearing his specially-tailored Soviet uniform attracts attention, from 
peers as well as adults. When the adults try to take it away, either to wash it or destroy it, 
the boy begins to exercise this power: 
After a while my long-unwashed uniform began to smell, but I still 
refused to part with it even for a day. The principal, annoyed by this 
insubordination, called two nurses and had them take it away by force. A 
jubilant crowd of boys witnessed the struggle. 
I broke from the clumsy women and ran out into the street. There I 
accosted four quietly strolling Soviet soldiers. . . . Then I wrote in careful 
language that the principal was the daughter of a landlord, that she hated 
the Red Army, and that she, together with the nurses exploited by her, beat 
me daily because of my uniform. 
As I expected, my message aroused the young soldiers. They 
followed me inside, and while one of them systematically smashed the 
flowerpots in the principal's office, the others chased the nurses, slapping 
them and pinching their bottoms. The frightened women yelled and 
screamed. 
After that the staff left me alone (21 1). 
The boy recognizes a means of gaining his end, that of keeping his uniform, which he 
feels attached to, not only as a memento of an experience, but also as a talisman of future 
desires, and he portrays the information that he needs to in order to achieve this result. 
The boy lies, but that lie is tied to survival; without the uniform he would lose a piece of 
his identity and perhaps the possibility of being reunited with Garvrila, his dominant 
goal. The boy has, by this point, learned a survival skill which includes the fluidity of 
truth. The other texts to follow, most notably Steps, Blind Date, Cockpit, and Kosinski's 
personal life, develop this theme further, playing out possibilities. 
Kosinski's personal life is filled with examples of this fluidity. There are 
countless examples besides those detailed above that show that Kosinski actively 
practiced this philosophy in his own life. Were his reasons as grounded as those of the 
boy in The Painted Bird? One effect of his careful Self-protection is that the answer to 
that question may never be known. However, what is known may well be enough: Jerzy 
Kosinski was a Holocaust survivor. This goes a long way to explain why, within the 
Kosinskian framework, survival is always the goal. Every survivor needed to develop a 
way of continuing to be. Failure to do so meant death, ashes. 
Again, in The Painted Bird we find reasons. "Once I pretended to pick up a 
mushroom which had dropped out of my basket and grasped a handful of this human 
dust. It stuck to my fingers and smelled of gasoline. I looked at it closely but cou1dJind 
no trace of aperson. Yet this ash was not like ash left in kitchen ovens where wood, 
dried peat, and moss were burned (101, emphasis mine). The Nazis would find the 
bodies by the side of the railroad tracks, bodies of Jews who had leapt from the trains, 
hoping for survival or preferring a quick death over the camps. When the bodies were 
found, the Nazi soldiers would pour gasoline over them and burn them on the spot. The 
boy knows this, and realizes that to be caught by the Nazis can mean to be no more. 
Those caught by the Nazis cease to be people, cease to resemble people, cease to have 
Self. For Kosinski, as for the little boy, this must not be allowed to happen. 
In a world where a village can be razed, looted, destroyed, and exterminated for 
hiding a Jew or Gypsy, where the law demands that one individual sacrifice another 
individual simply due to religion, culture, or appearance, where appearance is enough to 
convict and sentence an individual, an interior ethical model like that described above 
becomes necessary. 
One of the two epigrams in Blind Date is by Kosinski's friend, Jacques Monod. It 
says, 
But henceforth who is to define crime? Who shall decide what is good and 
what is evil? All the traditional systems have placed ethics and values 
beyond man's reach. Values did not belong to him; he belonged to them. 
He now knows that they are his and his alone.. . 
This echoes a Nietzsche's call to avoid mediocrity and assert the individual. "The 
'individual' stands ready, needing a set of laws of his own, needing his own skills and 
wiles for self-preservation, self-heightening, self-liberation" (Nietzsche 21 0). To be a Jew 
during the Holocaust and know the law was to be a Jew who must make a choice: follow 
the law and Self-extinguish or create an interior law. Not surprisingly, Kosinski chose the 
latter, following his father's lead. Kosinski's father determined that hiding the Jewish- 
ness of his family was the best option for their survival. His plan worked, and Kosinski 
learned from that. 
Different cultures have different notions of what constitutes mastery, 
macho, panache - cool. . . . But for a Holocaust survivor, mastery may 
mean something very different. For Kosinski it has to do with the ability to 
escape or vanish, or to make people believe you are not the Jew or Gypsy 
they think you are (Schiff 228). 
For Kosinski, hiding and deception are viable and acceptable means for survival. 
In this light, the option for Kosinski and his protagonists is to be either the Other- 
painted bird or the Self-painted bird. In either case, the Self, the subjective Self, that is, 
cannot be known. Kosinski's proclaimed favorite definition of the Self came from Gerard 
Manley Hopkins, who said, "[Mly self being, my consciousness and feeling of myself, 
that taste of myself, of I and me above and in all things, which is more distinctive than 
the taste of ale and alum, more distinctive than the smell of walnut leaf or camphor, and 
is incommunicabie by any means to another man . . . this self being of my own" (qtd. in 
Schiff 235, emphasis mine). Because the subjective Self cannot be communicated to the 
Other by any means, even if it desires to be, it becomes merely the determination of who 
will paint or create the phenomenological Self. As Sartre said, ". . . for human reality there 
is no difference between existing and choosing for itself' (Sartre 73 1). Kosinski, who 
revealed the dangers in The Painted Bird of allowing the Other to create the 
phenomenological Self, saw that willful determination of the Other's perceptions was the 
only option. 
That Self-Authorship held a strong fascination for Kosinski is evident in much of 
his work. Characters other than the protagonists also find themselves in the position of 
painting or being painted. The most striking example, found in Kosinski's life, Steps, 
Passion Play, and Blind Date, is the transsexual. Transsexuality is, in a sense, the 
ultimate Self-Authorship: a willful decision to modify the body itself, not just through 
exercise, hair style, or colored contact lenses, but through surgery on an aspect of the 
body that is strongly tied to a conception of Self. Where Kosinski made use of language 
to modify the perceptions of the Other, making the Other see what it expected or wanted 
to see, the transsexual creates the phenomenological Self that can be known 
experientially like no other Self. 
Thus far we have isolated four facets of the Kosinskian world: the division 
between the subjective and the phenomenological Self, the role of the subjective Self and 
the Other in the creation of the phenomenological Self, the demand for an interiorized 
ethical framework, and the motivation for willful presentation of the phenomenological 
Self: survival. With these tools in hand, we turn to a brief discussion of the implications 
of reading Kosinski's work through this lens. 
READING KOSINSKI'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL SELF 
Reading Kosinski's work on the basis of a subjective/phenomenological Self 
division requires a two-step process. First the actions must be seen as manifestations of a 
willful Self. Secondly, those manifestations have a motivation, often hidden from the 
reader. This may seem obvious, even to the casual reader, yet all too often a reader will 
see the action a character performs and not recognize the motivation behind it. 
Reviewers often remarked upon Kosinski's sadistic scenes, the frequent sexual 
encounters, and the estrangement of the protagonists from any meaningful relationship. 
However, few reviewers were able to recognize that this montage of action, the 
perpetuation of themes throughout Kosinski's work, was exactly what Kosinski was 
trying to portray. The sex was not a gratuitous attempt to titillate readers, but a sharp 
spotlight on the futile desire to become a subjective Self that can be known within a 
collective of two (or more). To be with another person is not to be able to reveal the 
subjective Self, but to reveal that the subjective Self is forever isolated and hidden from 
the Other. 
The sadistic element, often criticized for its inclusion in his continuing work, was 
not just "kink" or a migration of Kosinski the author's desires into his text, but a 
metaphor for the constant struggle of dominance between Self and Other, as well as a 
manifestation of the frustration generated by a failure to intersubjectivly connect. 
Kosinski attempted to explain this in his The Art of Self: 
"Hell is other people" (Sartre). Hell is the inability to escape from others 
who prove and prove again to you that you are as they see you. Hell is also 
the inability to be alone, to see yourself as your self sees you. Both convert 
the subjectivity of the other into a menacing object and originate the 
sadomasochistic struggle to impose our will upon the Other more 
dominantly than the Other can impose his or her will on us. At stake is the 
retention of the dominant position. This enables one to pronounce 
judgment, for only the subject can judge; the object can only be chosen. 
To choose is to manifest individuality (Passing By 239). 
This brief passage explains the metaphor of Kosinski's "kink," or at least justifies its 
presence within his continuing work: allegorical, parabolic, metaphorical, and realistic. 
That Kosinski himself visited S&M clubs as a voyeur should come as no surprise. 
In one sense, the existence of the clubs allowed Kosinski to witness the manifestation of 
that drive for dominance. In another, the willful participation in that lifestyle, by the club- 
goers, is another version of Self-Authorship. The phenomenological Self at its most 
willful and directed can be seen in a lifestyle that demands adherence to established roles. 
This is true in many facets of interpersonal relationships, but the S&M lifestyle is non- 
normative; it demands the portrayal of a role that is in conflict with the collective's 
acceptance. That makes it a willful authorship, rather than the often passive, unconscious 
adoption of traditional roles. 
That the people in Kosinski's novels, particularly the secondary characters, are 
flat and clichbd is in keeping with Kosinski's phenomenology of the Self. They are 
revealed to the reader as beings measured across a set of dimensions, whose dimensions 
are determined by the perceiver, either the protagonist or the author. In most cases, these 
are transitory cases, peopk met for an evening or on a subway, strangers. 
While we certainly do not know strangers better than we know those with 
whom we are intimate, we do know strangers in more neatly defined 
terms. We see strangers as blocks of objective traits identified with what 
lies in our past. We see them in theatrical terms; the complexity of mutual 
identification still lies ahead, since we are not yet involved; we respond to 
them now as to characters in the early stages of a play. We are still 
discovering; we are not empathizing. Not yet. The barrier between the 
illusory and the real, between sympathy and empathy, is still definite. At 
this point, we have not yet begun to care (228). 
This objectification, the flatness of perception of the Other, is due to two major factors: 
the need to experience the Other to a sufficient extent to begin to develop impressions 
that go beyond the surface, and habit. In regards to habit, Walter Benjamin has this to 
say, "[Hlabit determines to a large extent even optical reception. The latter, too, occurs 
much less through rapt attention than by noticing the object in incidental fashion." And 
later, "The public is an examiner, but an absent-minded one" (Benjamin 240-1). Kosinski 
made use of the lack of public awareness, in his texts as well as his life, to direct attention 
away from what he wished to hide toward what he wished to portray. This was his 
method of painting. 
Thus far, in developing this critical tool, this thesis has cited or referred to most of 
Kosinski's work: his novels, essays, and life. As this thesis is not intended to address 
Kosinski's full canon, little mention has been made of Passion Play and none of Pinball. 
Both, in this author's opinion, operate within this philosophy and a close reading of either 
will make that apparent. They are not so different fiom Kosinski's earlier work, 
philosophically. Kosinski's ninth novel, The Hermit of 6gh Street: The Working Papers 
of Norbert Kosky, has not been addressed for a different reason. Any attempt to develop a 
theory applicable to an author's canon should be able to account for that which is initially 
seen as an aberration, a change in style, or a movement in a new direction. 
Until the publication of The Hermit of 6gh Street, most reviewers saw Kosinski's 
major aberration as Being There: Chance does not manipulate Others, he does not exert 
the level of control on his environment that Kosinski's other protagonists do, and he is 
not wracked with anxiety over either hiding or revealing himself. After the powerful 
imagery and violence of Steps and The Painted Bird, Kosinski's third book caught many 
people unawares. 
However, Being There fits squarely within the Kosinskian framework. Chance is 
merely the object of Other's perceptions. He does little to influence Others, and his 
reception, treatment, and success is due solely to, well, chance. Though there is far more 
working within the text of Being There than just an examination of the Other-painted 
Self, it is perhaps in this text that it is so prevalent. That every word and action that 
comes from Chance is interpreted by the listenerlviewer is fore-grounded strongly, and it 
is this that defines it as a Kosinskian work. 
However, in 1988 Kosinski published The Hermit of 6gh Street, a novel 
significantly different than any he had written before. It is 529 pages long, and the pages 
are often arduous. Each is filled with quotes, stream of consciousness reflection, puns, 
word-play, and footnotes. The quotes come from Joseph Conrad, Jean-Paul Sartre, Joseph 
P. Schultz, George Steiner, Albert Einstein, Roland Barthes, Araham Joshua Heschel, 
Victor Schlovsky, Victor Hugo, John Adams, Thomas Wolfe, Anai's Nin, Emily Bronte, 
himself, the fictional characters from his earlier novels, and hundreds of other sources. 
Jewish theology, Tantric wisdom, adult magazines, and other diverse texts are quoted, 
referenced, or recommended to the reader. 
Kosinski cited everything, drew from a wide range of thought, and constructed a 
text that is massive in its breadth. The result has been called many things: a defense 
against the charges leveled by the Village Voice, a commentary on the creative process, 
an apology to his readers and fans, a self-absorbed and self-interested project, and a 
postmodern work with history as its primary concern. Larry McCaffery gets close to the 
text when he says, 
Georges Bataille once made the useful distinction between the avant-garde 
novel whose experiments seem to be made for the sake of experiments 
versus the novel whose peculiar features seem born out of necessity. The 
Hermit of 6gh Street is a work so excessive and self-involved, so 
obviously written by Kosinski for himself, that it seems born out of 
precisely that sense of necessity and compulsiveness. It is a sense that is 
rare among writers but common among survivors (McCaffery 1 15). 
McCaffery understands much of what moved Kosinski to write such a complex and 
difficult novel. Kosinski did not write The Hermit of 6qh Street to just create an 
experimental novel, though he did do so, but because he was compelled to find a form 
that would say what it was he needed to say. 
Like Being There, as well as the rest of Kosinski's canon, The Hermit of 6qh 
Street does many things. It proves to the world, in a very clear way, that Kosinski could 
write and, moreover, was comfortable enough with his adoptive language to play with it. 
It questions the ability of an author to create a truly original text; the use of footnotes and 
quotes, especially from other writers who had had accusations leveled against them, not 
to mention dialogue between characters, serves to show the wealth of sources every 
author uses, consciously and unconsciously, in writing, and the impossibility of 
accounting for them all. It creates a metaphor for the Village Voice expose, using the 
question of whether Norbert Kosky can float in water as its central question. 
Yet, it does more than that. The Hermit of 6qh Street is a close examination of the 
Self. It is also, of course, a willful presentation of the phenomenological Self. The casual 
reader who picks up The Hermit of 6qh Street, without any, or at best minimal, 
knowledge of Kosinski's writings or life, will find it jumps from scene to scene and 
dialogue to dialogue, interspersed with quotes and footnotes, footnotes that often have no 
apparent relationship to the text. However, for the Kosinski scholar, The Hermit of 6qh 
Street is a dense and jarring view of Kosinski. Within the confines of 529 pages (633 in 
the revised paperback edition, published in 1 Wl), Kosinski addresses his entire life: his 
childhood in Poland, his relationship with his mother and father, his dream of success, 
sudden fame, his acting career, the movie version of Being There, his efforts to release 
political prisoners, his work with PEN, the Village Voice scandal, his late enthusiasm for 
floating motionless in water, his return to and study of the Judaic faith, the pranks he 
pulled at social gatherings, his voyeuristic interests, his relationship with Halina 
Poswiatowska (and other women), his dealings with publishers. The list goes on. But that 
is not all; it also includes his fictional characters: Levanter, Chance, the boy from The 
Painted Bird. All this weight, this history and dense intertextuality, bear down on the 
reader, in an apparent effort to reveal what it is to be Jerzy Kosinski. That Kosinski lived 
within this set of relationships, thinly fictionalized, is undoubted. There is much of the 
man in the fiction. 
Yet, The Hermit of 6gh Street does not contain all. Notably, Kosinski's marriage 
to his second wife, Katherina von Fraunhofer ("Kiki") never appears. To be sure, there 
are many things that happened in Kosinski's life that did not find their way into the life of 
Kosky in The Hermit of 6gh Street, yet it would appear that, for reasons unknown, 
Kosinski made the decision not to include his marriage. That details that one would 
expect to be of less importance found their way into the text indicates that Kosinski's 
painting was still ongoing. 
In a particularly moving moment in the novel, Kosky meets and speaks with the 
ghost of his father, Israel Kosky. At one point in the dialogue, Kosinski brings up the 
popular story that he, like the boy in The Painted Bird, had once been thrown into a pit of 
manure: 
"Stop talking like Billy Sidis, " says his father, "And stop talking 
about floating. In any case, what do you need floating for?" 
"To save myself again from drowning, as I almost did - in a pit of 
manure." 
"What pond of manure? What did you say?" his father recoils. "I 
can't read your lips. What do you mean by 'again7 and '1 almost did'? 
Who threw you into the pond of manure?" 
"Nobody," says our little Hippocampus. "It was just my new fairy 
tale" (Hermit 3 10). 
This passage would seem revelatory, an open admission, often questioned, about his past 
during World War 11. His father, who knew better, who knew that they were all together 
during the war, could not be lied to about exploits elsewhere accepted as truth, and 
Kosinski seemed to use this point to "come clean" with the reader. 
Unfortunately, this is not clear. Within the same passage, Kosinski brings up his 
speechlessness and polo playing, both points of contention (Lupack 6, Klinkowitz 197). 
Of course, The Hermit of 6gh Street is fiction. As Kosinski explained it, "Auto fiction (or 
'eye to I,' as it is sometimes called) is a literary genre, generous enough to let the author 
adopt the nature of his fictional protagonist - not the other way around (Passing By 15). 
So, in this case, there is nothing of Jerzy Kosinski in the novel, but there is novel in Jerzy 
Kosinski. But there is, but there isn't. In the confusion created by this paradox, one need 
look no fiu-ther than the last page of the text, where he lists five quotes by, in order, 
Joseph Conrad, Jerzy Kosinski, Freud, Mark Twain, and William James Sidis. Kosinski's 
quote is the only one entirely in capital letters. It says, "THIS BOOK IS WHOLLY 
FICTION" (Hermit 529). Once again, Kosinski succeeds in pulling in the reader, making 
the reader identifj the author with the fictional protagonist, inviting the comparison, and 
then moving away when the reader isn't looking. 
Ultimately, The Hermit of 6gh Street is very much about Jerzy Kosinski, but it is 
about his phenomenological Self. The subjective Self, as always, as it must, remains 
hidden, undiscoverable, elusive, and, finally, incommunicable. There is no way to know 
Jerzy Kosinski as Jerzy Kosinski knew himself. We can only know him, his texts, and the 
characters that people his texts by their actions, their phenomenology. 
One last point about Kosinski, his canon, and specifically The Hermit of 6Ph 
Street: once again we need to turn to the quote by Sartre that states, "Authenticity and 
individuality have to be earned: I shall be my own authenticity only if under the influence 
of the call of conscience . . . I launch out toward death with a resolute-decision . . . as 
toward my own most peculiar possibility. At this moment I reveal myself to myself in 
authenticity, and I raise others along with myself toward the authentic" (Sartre 332). At 
the end of The Hermit of 6Ph Street, Norbert Kosky, who has battled most of the novel 
with accusations that he was a "false floater," a charlatan who could not make good on 
his claims to float by regulating his breathing, is accosted by four men who knock him 
senseless. 
Now, picking our man up as if he were a detached handle and 
manhandling him a bit, two of them drag him by his feet, and by his feet 
alone . . . 
They keep on dragging him all the way to the end of the pier. . . . 
They drag him beyond that sign IMPASSE, all the way to the end 
of the dockyard. . . . 
Now, these faceless men - faceless since what matters in a tale is a 
moral - pick him up as if he were a doll. First they grab him by his arms, 
legs and torso; then they swing him back and forth, forth and back - then 
they toss him - toss him out of an invisible hammock suspended in the 
invisible air, toss him up, not down. 
When I looked once more for Gatsby he had vanished, and I 
was alone again in the unquiet darkness. (F. Scott Fitzgerald) He flies 
up like a bird, but up only for a moment so short it already seems ago - 
then, he starts falling down. He: the unsinkable Lotus Man disguised as 
the American Unsinkable Molly Brown. 
The end came suddenly. (Thomas Wolfe) (Hermit 527). 
He is tossed into the water at the end of the pier, that much is obvious. Yet, Kosinski 
wants the reader to think about this scene. That's why he said "what matters in a tale is a 
moral." The reader who has been paying attention (which several reviewers were not), 
will know that Kosky believes that he can float, and that his detractors believe he can not. 
Again, a part of the essay Kosinski wrote on suicide in "The Art of Self:" "He 
imposes on other people the necessity for remembering and for judging him, for 
summarizing him as a character. He creates the means to outlive himself' (Passing By 
23 1). Kosinski does not tell the reader whether Kosky lives or dies, floats or sinks, was a 
liar or authentic. He leaves that up to the reader to decide. Ultimately, Kosinski left his 
life and work up for the Other to judge, probably because the Other would anyway. He 
had painted as much as he could. 
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